Would I lie to you? Self-serving lies and other-oriented lies told across different media

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Abstract

This study set out to investigate the type of media individuals are more likely to tell self-serving and other-oriented lies, and whether this varied according to the target of the lie. One hundred and fifty participants rated on a likert-point scale how likely they would tell a lie. Participants were more likely to tell self-serving lies to people not well-known to them. They were more likely to tell self-serving lies in email, followed by phone, and finally face-to-face. Participants were more likely to tell other-oriented lies to individuals they felt close to and this did not vary according to the type media. Participants were more likely to tell harsh truths to people not well-known to them via email.

Introduction

Psychologists have been very interested in the types of people who are more likely to lie (Dike et al., 2005, Kashy and DePaulo, 1996), why people lie (Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984), the types of lies people tell (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), how frequently individuals lie (DePaulo et al., 1996), to whom they tell their lies to (Williams, 2001), and more recently, across which modes of communication individuals are more likely to lie in (Hancock, Thom-Santelli, & Ritchie, 2004). Knowing where people are more likely to lie has important implications for people’s everyday lives (e.g., their work situations, personal relationships). In this study we were interested in two types of lies: self-serving lies and other-oriented lies, told over the phone, email, and face-to-face.

Goffman was interested in the ways people present themselves in their everyday face-to-face encounters. In his book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) argued for a dualistic image of the self. He described the self as both a performer and a character. According to Goffman (1959) the ‘self-as-performer’ is not merely a social product, but also has a basic motivational core which motivates individuals. In contrast, the ‘self-as-character’ represents an individuals’ unique humanity. It is this part of the self which is a social product; that is, performed outwardly in social life. The ‘self-as-character’ is one’s inner self.

Goffman believed that individuals need to present themselves as an acceptable person to others. He stated that “the impressions that the others give tend to be treated as claims and promises they have implicitly made, and claims and promises tend to have a moral character” (Goffman, 1959/1997, p. 21). He argued that individuals can be strategic in their impression formation. In particular, Goffman was interested in distinguishing between expressions ‘given’ (e.g., spoken communication) and expressions ‘given off’ (e.g., non-verbal cues) in a face-to-face interaction.

Theorists, such as DePaulo et al. (1996), have drawn from Goffman’s theory to argue that “many of the lies of everyday life are told to avoid tension and conflict and to minimize hurt feelings and ill will” (p. 980). To test their claims they carried out two diary studies of lying. As predicted they found that lying is a part of daily life. Importantly, DePaulo et al. (1996) also found that the lies people told either served the liars’ own self-interests or were told to protect the person they were lying to – although most lies were self-serving ones. They also found, in line with Goffman’s theory, that many of their participants lied to protect themselves from embarrassment, disapproval, or conflict rather than for material gain or personal advantage. In addition, they regularly lied to protect the feelings of the targets of the lie.

Few theorists have investigated whether lying varies depending on whom the lie is being told to. Should we expect that the types of lies told and the frequency of telling a lie varies according to the relationship one has with the person one is telling the lie to? Some research has suggested this is the case. For example, De Paulo and Kashy (1998) found that their participants reported telling fewer lies to people they were close to and would feel uncomfortable when they did lie to these people. In addition, they found that relatively more of the lies told to best friends and friends were altruistic rather than self-serving. Drawing again from Goffman’s theory if one is to remain authentic in their friends’ eyes then one has to present a consistent image of the self; hence, it is more risky trying to sustain a credible character to one’s friends if one tells them self-serving lies. Moreover, we would expect that individuals want to ensure that those they care about maintain their dignity and consequently would be more motivated to tell other-oriented lies to individuals one is close to.

Researchers have begun to investigate deception in cyberspace (e.g., Birchmeier et al., 2005, Caspi and Gorsky, 2006, Cornwell and Lundgren, 2001, Utz, 2005, Whitty, 2002, Whitty and Carr, 2006). Whitty (2002), for instance, has found that lying is a ubiquitous phenomenon in chat rooms. She found that 28% of male users lied about their gender. Cornwell and Lundgren (2001) found that 27.5% of their respondents lied online about their physical attractiveness, 22.5% about their age, 17.5% about their background, and 15% about their interests. Utz (2005) found that online attractiveness deception was deemed more severe than gender switching and identity concealment. Interestingly, Caspi and Gorsky (2006) found that 84% of their sample experienced enjoyment from telling a lie online.

Researchers have also been interested in whether individuals are more like to lie in one medium more than another. An important study conducted by Hancock et al. (2004) suggests this is the case. These researchers examined lying in face-to-face situations, over the phone, via instant messenger, and via email. Participants kept a diary where they had to record their social interactions and lies for a week. They found that the highest proportion of lies occurred on the phone and least in email.

Hancock et al. (2004) contend that their results do not support theories, such as, the ‘Social Distance Theory’ and ‘Media Richness Theory’. ‘Social Distance Theory’ argues that because lying makes individuals feel uncomfortable, they will choose less rich media in order to maintain social distance between themselves and the person they are lying to. In respect to the four types of media Hancock et al. (2004) examined, individuals would lie most in email, followed by instant messenger, followed by phone, and then face-to-face. ‘Media Richness Theory’, in contrast, suggests that because lying is highly equivocal individuals elect to lie more in rich media, which includes multiple cue systems, immediate feedback, natural language, and message personalisation. Hence, this theory would predict that individuals would lie in face-to-face situations more, following by phone, instant messenger, and email.

Given the results yielded from their study, Hancock and colleagues (2004) developed a new theory to explain lying across different media. They suggest that researchers need to consider other dimensions besides richness and distance. In their new ‘Feature Based Theory’, the additional dimensions they include are synchronous, recordless, and distributed (i.e., not copresent) communication. This theory proposes that the more synchronous and distributed, but the less recordable a medium is, the more frequently lying should occur. One lies more in synchronous interactions, because the majority of lying is spontaneous and hence synchronous communication should present more opportunities to lie. In recorded communication one is aware that their conversation is potentially kept or stored (e.g., in a saved email) and can be referred to in future conversations; hence, one is less likely to lie if they are aware that there is proof of their lie that can be referred to later. In media where participants are not distributed, deception should be constrained to some degree as some lies can be immediately obvious (e.g., it is easier to lie in email saying one is writing a report when really one is actually playing a computer game). Hence, because telephone conversations are distributed, synchronous, and recordless, the most amount of lying should take place in this media, as supported by their results. On the other hand, email is distributed, but not synchronous or recordless and therefore, as supported by their study, had the lowest rate of deception.

This current study extends upon current literature on lying. Based on the above evidence, the following hypotheses were developed.

  • H1:

    Individuals will be more likely to tell self-serving lies to individuals not well-known to them than they are to tell self-serving lies to individuals close to them.

    This first hypothesis is based on Goffman’s theory outlined earlier in this paper. Goffman (1959/1997) discussed in detail the knowledge we have about others and argued that we are more likely to know the ‘inner self’ of people who are close to us. Hence, one is much less likely to get caught out telling a self-serving lie to individuals not well-known to them. Moreover, individuals are more likely to care about the opinion of people close to them and so if caught out telling a self-serving they have much more to lose.

  • H2:

    Individuals will be more likely to tell other-oriented lies to individuals close to them than they are to tell other-oriented lies to individuals not well-known to them.

    This hypothesis is based on DePaulo et al.’s (1996) work which found that many lies are told to protect the feelings of the targets of the lies. If this argument is correct, we would expect individuals to tell people that are close to other-oriented lies given that we would expect that they care more for these individuals than they do for strangers.

    In addition to testing out these hypotheses we wanted to examine whether Hancock et al.’s (2004) ‘Feature Based’ theory still holds when we also consider the type of lie told as well as the target of the lie. To reiterate, his theory predicts that people are more likely to lie in synchronous, distributed, and non-recordable mediums. Given this we hypothesized that:

  • H3:

    Individuals are more likely to lie on the phone than in face-to-face settings.

  • H4:

    Individuals are more likely to lie on the phone than in email.

  • H5:

    Individuals are more likely to lie in face-to-face settings than they are in email.

Section snippets

Materials

A survey was constructed for this study. Participants were initially asked to provide information on their gender, age, and employment status. Following from this, participants were expected to respond to twelve hypothetical scenarios. Six of the scenarios presented the participant with a ‘self-serving’ lie and six an ‘other-oriented’ lie. In six of the scenarios individuals had to imagine telling the lie to either someone close to them and in the other six they had to imagine telling the lie

Results

Paired t-tests were performed to determine if there was a significant difference in the likelihood to tell self-serving lies to people the participants did not know well compared to individuals the participants were close to (see Table 1). As predicted in every medium individuals were much more likely to tell self-serving lies to others they did not know well than those close to them. The magnitude of the differences in the means, according to Cohen (1988), was very large.

A repeated measures

Discussion

This study investigated whether individuals are more likely to tell self-serving lies or other-oriented lies to people close to them or to people not well-known to them. Moreover, it drew from Hancock et al.’s (2004) ‘Feature Based’ model to examine which type of media individuals are more likely to lie in. In line with previous research, the means elicited in this study suggested that lying is a part of individuals’ everyday lives. This study also suggests that lying is ubiquitous across all

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